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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Albert A. Ciccone appeals from the judgment dismissing his petition for 
post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Ciccone 
argues the district court erred in denying relief on his claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not obtaining and submitting a written report of his psychological 
evaluation as mitigation evidence at sentencing. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
"Ciccone struck his pregnant wife with his car, killing her and the unborn 
fetus." State v. Ciccone, 154 Idaho 330, 334, 297 P.3d 1147, 1151 (Ct. App. 
2012). A jury found him guilty of the first degree murder of his wife and the 
second degree murder of the unborn child. & The district court imposed a 
determinate life sentence for the first degree murder conviction and a concurrent 
determinate 15-year sentence for the second degree murder conviction. & 
Ciccone filed an appeal, but the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as 
untimely. &; State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305,246 P.3d 958 (2010). 
Ciccone filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a notice of appeal from the 
judgment in the underlying criminal case. (R., p.19.) Pursuant to a stipulation of 
the parties, the district court granted post-conviction relief and reentered the 
judgment of conviction to allow Ciccone to perfect a timely appeal. Ciccone, 154 
Idaho at 334, 297 P.3d at 1151. Ciccone timely appealed from the reentered 
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judgment, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Ciccone's conviction and 
sentence. 
Ciccone timely filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging, inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining a written 
report of a psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Craig Beaver (who was 
appointed to evaluate Ciccone at defense counsel's request) and not submitting 
that report as mitigation evidence at sentencing. (R., pp.17-29.) The district 
court appointed counsel and granted Ciccone an evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.30-
31, 36-37, 108-09; see generally 12/12/14 Tr. (hereinafter "Tr.").) Following the 
hearing, the district court entered an order dismissing Ciccone's petition in its 




Ciccone states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the District Court err in denying relief given that Mr. 
Ciccone established that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
present Dr. Beaver's evaluation to the Court for sentencing 
purposes? 
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Ciccone failed to show error in the district court's finding that Ciccone 
failed to prove his claim that counsel was ineffective for not obtaining a written 
report of Dr. Beaver's psychological evaluation and presenting it as mitigation 
evidence at sentencing? 
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ARGUMENT 
Ciccone Has Failed To Show Error In the District Court's Finding That Ciccone 
Failed To Prove His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
A. Introduction 
Ciccone argues the district court erred in denying post-conviction relief on 
his ciaim that trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining a written report of a 
psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Craig Beaver and presenting it as 
mitigation at sentencing. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-9.) Ciccone's argument fails. 
Application of the law to the facts supports the district court's determination that 
Ciccone failed to carry his burden of proof with respect to either the deficient 
performance or prejudice prongs of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil 
proceedings in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her 
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 
838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); !.C.R. 57(c)). 
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings 
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of 
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 27 4, 
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). A trial court's decision that a post-
4 
conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. 
Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, 
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within 
the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P .3d 
108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,137,774 P.2d 299,307 (1989). With respect to the 
deficient performance prong, the United States Supreme Court has articulated 
the defendant's burden under Strickland as follows: 
To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a 
conviction must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. A court considering a claim 
of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption that 
counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. The challenger's burden is to show that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as 
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (citations and quotations 
omitted). "This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or 
strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless 
those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, 
or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Arellano v. State, 158 
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Idaho 708, _, 351 P.3d 636, 638 (Idaho App. 2015) (citing Howard v. State, 
126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,263 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787. "A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." lit (citations 
and quotations omitted). 
D. Ciccone Failed To Meet His Burden Of Proving Counsel Was Ineffective 
For Not Obtaining And Submitting A Written Report Of Dr. Beaver's 
Psychological Evaluation For Use At Sentencing 
Before Ciccone was sentenced in the underlying criminal case, the parties 
stipulated that Dr. Craig Beaver be appointed to evaluate Ciccone's mental 
condition. (Tr., p.55, Ls.1-10; Respondent's Exhibit 13, pp.9-10 (Order Re: 
Evaluation).) Dr. Beaver conducted a psychological evaluation, but Ciccone did 
not submit a written report of that evaluation for the district court's consideration 
at sentencing. (Respondent's Exhibit 4 (Sentencing Tr., p.1880, L.12 - p.1881, 
L.14).) When the district court asked trial counsel why a report of the 
psychological evaluation it had authorized was not among the sentencing 
materials, counsel explained: 
Judge, an evaluation was conducted. But after due 
consideration and conference with the evaluator and my client, it 
was elected not to have the report prepared for sentencing. 
The order does not require us to prepare a report or to bring 
forth the evaluator for purposes of testimony. Essentially that order 
was for purposes of securing the evaluation at county expense, but 
I was not required, under Rule 702 or otherwise, to disclose the 
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contents or the findings of that evaluation, and no written report has 
been prepared. 
(Id.) The trial court noted for the record the defense's choice "notto make use of 
the evaluation" (Respondent's Exhibit 4 (Sentencing Tr., p.1881, L.19 - p.1882, 
L.1)), and it ultimately sentenced Ciccone after considering all of the information 
provided to it, which included both general information about Ciccone's personal 
and family mental health history and medical records documenting the state of 
Ciccone's mental health very near the time he committed the murders 
(Respondent's Exhibit 4 (Sentencing Tr., p.1944, L.19 - p.1945, L.9); see also 
Respondent's Exhibits 2 (victim impact letters), 3 (character letters), 14 (military 
records), 15 (records of inpatient treatment at lntermountain Hospital)). 
In his post-conviction petition, Ciccone alleged trial counsel was 
ineffective for not obtaining a written report of the psychological evaluation 
conducted by Dr. Beaver and submitting that report as mitigation evidence at 
sentencing. (R., p'p.23-26.) The district court dismissed this claim after an 
evidentiary hearing, finding Ciccone failed to carry his burden of proving trial 
counsel's decision to not obtain and present a written report of Dr. Beaver's 
psychological evaluation was the result of any objective shortcoming or that 
Ciccone was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency. (R., pp.175-79.) Contrary to 
Ciccone's assertions on appeal, a review of the appiicabie law and the record 
supports the district court's ruling. 
Under Idaho law, a district court must appoint a psychiatrist or 
psychologist to examine and report on the defendant's mental condition "[i]f there 
is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a significant 
7 
factor at sentencing and for good cause shown." I.C. § 19-2522(1 ). However, 
"the decision of trial counsel whether to investigate or present mitigating 
evidence [in the form of a psychological evaluation] is assessed for 
reasonableness, giving deference to counsel's judgment." Richman v. State, 
138 Idaho 190; 193; 59 P.3d 995, 998 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Wallace v. Ward, 
191 F.3d 1235, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999)). To establish prejudice, a petitioner 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to 
obtain a psychological examination for use at sentencing must establish that, but 
for the alleged failure, his sentence would have been different. Richman, 138 
Idaho at 194, 59 P.3d at 99. 
In this case, it is undisputed that trial counsel sought and obtained an 
order appointing Dr. Beaver to evaluate Ciccone's mental condition. Ciccone 
testified at the evidentiary hearing that trial counsel indicated a belief that a 
psychological evaluation might be useful as mitigating evidence at sentencing in 
light of Ciccone's "mental health history," which included a failed suicide attempt 
and inpatient treatment at lntermountain Hospital "in September into October of 
2003, 11 days prior to [Ciccone's] incarceration" in the underlying criminal case. 
(Tr., p.23, L.14 - p.24, L.13.) Ciccone testified that, after Dr. Beaver conducted 
the evaluation, he and his trial counsel had a conversation in which trial counsel 
advised Ciccone that the "evaluation didn't go well" and that it would not be in 
Ciccone's best interest to obtain a written report of that evaluation. (Tr., p.24, 
Ls.14-19, p.29, Ls.13-24.) According to Ciccone, counsel did not elaborate 
regarding "the problem" a written evaluation would pose; "[h]e just said he felt it 
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would be unfavorable" and that "he wasn't going to do an official report because, 
once an official report was made, then the Court would have access to it whether 
he wanted them to or not." (Tr., p.24, L.20 - p.25, L.16.) Ciccone testified that, 
at the time, he trusted his trial counsel and believed "he was acting in [Ciccone's] 
best faith." (Tr., p.25, Ls.6-8, p.30, Ls.2-5.) 
Aside from his own testimony, the only other evidence Ciccone presented 
in relation to this claim was the affidavit of Dr. Craig Beaver. (See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit B.) Dr. Beaver recalled that he and his staff conducted the testing and 
interviews necessary to create a written evaluation of Ciccone's mental condition 
but noted that "[n]o formal final written evaluation was created." (Id., 1{1{ 3-7 .) Dr. 
Beaver had "no independent recollection of the reasons underlying the decision 
to not create a formal evaluation" but stated his "practice would have been to 
create one unless [trial counsel] requested [he] do otherwise." (Id., ,T 8.) 
According to Dr. Beaver, had a formal evaluation been created, it would have 
contained the following opinions and conclusions: 
a. Mr. Ciccone's MMPI testing results showed a markedly 
elevated profile indicating significant emotional and/or 
psychiatric issues; 
b. Mr. Ciccone's psychiatric history revealed significant mood 
instability; 
c. Mr. Ciccone's family history revealed a significant history of 
bipolar disorders; 
d. There was a significant mental-health component related to 
the events surrounding the death of Mr. Ciccone's wife and 
unborn child[.] 
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(Id., ,I 9.) Dr. Beaver had "no independent recollection of informing [trial counsel] 
of the opinions and conclusions described above" but stated it would have been 
his practice at the time "to inform trial counsel of these opinions and 
conclusions." (Id., ,I 10.) Finally, as it relates to the claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not obtaining and presenting a written report of Dr. Beaver's 
psychological evaluation for use at sentencing, Dr. Beaver opined that such 
report, had it been created, "would have assisted the Court in determining Mr. 
Ciccone's sentence and, in fact, may very well have led the Court to a sentence 
other than fixed-life." (Id., ,i 11.) 
After Ciccone rested, the state called trial counsel, who testified regarding 
his reasons for not obtaining and submitting a written report of Dr. Beaver's 
psychological evaluation for use at sentencing. (Tr., p.55, L.1 - p.67, L.24.) 
Trial counsel testified he received a "verbal report" from Dr. Beaver, during which 
trial counsel took notes and after which trial counsel conducted his own research 
regarding one of Dr. Beaver's diagnoses. (Tr., p.57, L.18 - p.59, L.12; 
Respondent's Exhibit 13 (trial counsel's notes and research).) Following their 
discussion, trial counsel directed Dr. Beaver not to produce a formal written 
report because counsel did not believe such report would be in Ciccone's best 
interest. (Tr., p.59, Ls.13-22.) When asked why that was so, trial counsel, 
referring to his notes, explained: 
The discussions I had with Dr. Beaver were over the phone; 
they were not in-person as my notes reflect. Mr. Ciccone did suffer 
from major depression; it was recurrent. But Dr. Beaver also 
diagnosed Mr. Ciccone with borderline personality disorder. And if 
you see him - in reference to line 4, it says "first wife." Dr. Beaver 
had done the home study in my divorce from my ex-wife, and his 
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comment to me was, "Terry, he's just like your first wife, 
remember?" And that's why I wrote "first wife." And she was a 
borderline personality disorder. So it really hit home to me, and 
that's why I put "controlling and abusive." 
He also indicated, line 5, that Mr. Ciccone was in deep 
denial of his culpability. Line 6 I talked about - because I was 
using him for sentencing, if you look at page 1 of the order re: 
Evaluation, the last line says that the sentencing evaluation be 
done prior to sentencing. So what we were concerned about, and 
given the factors the Court has to consider as to the safety of the 
community, I asked Dr. Beaver if he would kill again. And Dr. 
Beaver's response was, "I don't know. It's context specific. And by 
the time they get to their 40s, they're usually more mature and less 
violent." 
So with that [in] mind, that information, I didn't want Dr. 
Beaver's report for the sentencing judge to hear that. 
(Tr., p.63, L.6 - p.64, L.10.) Trial counsel testified he was also concerned that, if 
he obtained a written report of Dr. Beaver's psychological evaluation, the state 
could request that Ciccone be evaluated by its own expert who, at the time, the 
defense bar referred to as "Dr. Death because nothing he said as a psychologist 
or mental doctor assisted our clients in any way."1 (Tr., p.64, L.15 - p.66, L.5.) 
In addition to trial counsel's testimony, the state also presented a number 
of documentary exhibits, including the victim impact letters submitted at 
sentencing (Respondent's Exhibit 2); character letters offered by the defense at 
1 Trial counsel also testified he had reviewed Dr. Beaver's affidavit and did not 
see in that affidavit any reference to or diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder. (Tr., p.66, L.1 O - p.67, L.18.) Trial counsel explained that his 
professional relationship with Dr. Beaver had recently deteriorated due to a 
personal matter and, while counsel did not believe Dr. Beaver's affidavit was in 
any way influenced by the "falling-out," he did believe Dr. Beaver's interpretation 
of his own notes was not consistent with the notes trial counsel made 
contemporaneously with their discussion in 2005. (Tr., p.67, Ls.19-24, p. 78, 
L.20 - p.80, L.2.) 
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sentencing, many of which referred to Ciccone's personal and family history of 
mental health issues (Respondent's Exhibit 3); the sentencing hearing transcript 
(Respondent's Exhibit 4); Ciccone's military records (Respondent's Exhibit 14); 
and the records of Ciccone's treatment at lntermountain Hospital following his 
failed suicide attempt in September 2003, in which the examining psychologist 
diagnosed Ciccone with major depression but opined "at discharge (less than 
two weeks before the death of Mr. Ciccone's wife) that [Ciccone] 'was not felt to 
be a threat to himself or others and had no suicidal or homicidal ideation"' (R., 
p.171 (citing Respondent's Exhibit 15)). The latter two items were appended to 
the PSI in the underlying criminal case. (Tr., p.84, Ls.8-12; R., p.176.) 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court applied the relevant 
legal standards to the evidence before it and correctly concluded Ciccone failed 
to meet his burden of proving trial counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. (R., pp.175-79.) Specifically, the court 
found: 
The evidence at hearing has established that Petitioner's counsel 
made a strategic and tactical decision not to have a written 
psychological evaluation prepared and submitted at sentencing. At 
sentencing, in addition to the mental health records indicating that 
the Petitioner was not a danger to himself or others approximately 
_ ten days before the Petitioner ran over his wife, the court also had 
Petitioner's military records showing above average military 
performance of the [Petitioner] with exemplary on and off duty 
conduct as recently as January 20, 2003. (Ex. 14). Defense 
counsel had presented letters of the family describing a family 
history of mental illness and many character letters describing the 
Petitioner's good character. Trial defense counsel testified he was 
aware of the results of Dr. Beaver's evaluation and had even done 
research about Dr. Beaver's conclusions. Trial defense counsel 
described his rationale for his decision, including the strategy of not 
presenting a new written psychological evaluation to preclude the 
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State from requesting an additional evaluation of the Defendant -
which counsel, based on his experience and expertise, did not feel 
would be favorable toward the Defendant. 
Dr. Beaver opined nine years later that he felt his diagnosis 
and findings related to mood instability and a markedly elevated 
profile indicating significant emotional and/or psychiatric issues 
would have assisted the Court in determining Mr. Ciccone's 
sentence, and in fact, may very well have lessened the sentence 
the court gave. But the trial defense counsel explained his 
assessment of the evaluation nine years ago, had notes made 
contemporaneously supporting that assessment, and described a 
reasonable strategy related to the assessment of why, in his 
training and experience, Judge Wetherell would have differed from 
Dr. Beaver's opinion. 
(R., pp.177-78; see also R., p.178 (finding, in light of trial counsel's testimony 
and the favorable mental health evidence that was before the sentencing court, 
that trial counsel's decision not to produce the report was a "reasonable strategic 
or tactical decision" and "was not due to inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review").) The court 
also found Ciccone failed to meet his burden of proving prejudice, reasoning: 
[l]n an objective review of the complete record before the court at 
sentencing, the attorney's conduct did not prejudice [Ciccone] at 
sentencing, would not have changed the outcome of the sentence, 
and in fact, presented a more favorable defense for [Ciccone] even 
with the risk of a countervailing report by a psychologist for the 
State. 
(R., p.179.) 
On appeal, Ciccone contends the district court erred in denying relief as to 
this claim, arguing the evidence showed that trial counsel's "decision to not 
submit a report from Dr. Beaver [was] based upon both factual and legal errors," 
and "the deficiency was prejudicial because there is a reasonable probability that 
but for counsel's deficiency the outcome of the proceedings would have been 
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different." (Appellant's brief, p.5 (citation omitted).) Neither of these arguments 
withstands analysis. 
Ciccone claims that, in making his decision to not obtain and submit a 
written report of Dr. Beaver's psychological evaluation, trial counsel mistakenly 
Ciccone is controlling and abusive." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) As evidence that 
counsel was mistaken, Ciccone points to counsel's research on borderline 
personality disorder (submitted at the evidentiary hearing as part of 
Respondent's Exhibit 13), which, he claims, "does not reference controlling or 
abusive behavior." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Even a cursory review of counsel's 
research shows, however, that it is Ciccone who is mistaken. While the research 
article counsel relied upon does not explicitly use the words "controlling" and 
"abusive," it clearly states that individuals with borderline personality disorder 
often exhibit "low anxiety tolerance," "poor impulse control," "chaotic" and 
"extreme relationships with others," "frequent expressions of anger," "stormy 
relationships," "manipulativeness," "masochism/sadism," "demandingness," 
"entitlement," and "[a]nger that is inappropriate, intense or uncontrollable." 
(Respondent's Exhibit 13, pp.3-8 (article entitled "Borderline Personality 
Disorder").) All of these traits are consistent with counsel's notes, made during 
his discussion with Dr. Beaver, that Ciccone specifically is or that individuals with 
borderline personality disorder generally are "controlling" and "abusive." (Id., 
p.1.) Even if not equivalent to "controlling" and "abusive," the diagnosis is at the 
very least unfavorable. Ciccone failed to prove it was objectively unreasonable 
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for counsel, after discussing Ciccone's diagnosis with Dr. Beaver and conducting 
his own research that showed individuals with borderline personality disorder 
exhibit a number of unflattering traits, to forego obtaining a written report that 
would have reflected negatively on Ciccone's character. 2 This is especially true 
that his decision to not obtain and submit a written evaluation rested not only on 
the fact that Dr. Beaver had diagnosed Ciccone with borderline personality 
disorder, but also on that fact that Dr. Beaver opined Ciccone was "in deep 
denial of his culpability." (Tr., p.63, Ls.20-21; Respondent's Exhibit 13, p.1.) 
Ciccone also claims trial counsel's decision to forego a written evaluation 
was objectively unreasonable because it was based on two mistakes of law. The 
first mistake, Ciccone argues, "was that any written report would even have to 
include a diagnosis." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) Ciccone posits that, because I.C. § 
19-2522(3)(b) requires "[a] diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental 
condition of the defendant" (emphasis added), counsel could have asked Dr. 
Beaver to produce a written "evaluation of Mr. Ciccone's mental health situation 
and his prognosis without including the term 'borderline personality disorder"' 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 7-8). Ciccone apparently believes that, to be effective, 
2 In a further attempt to demonstrate that trial counsel was mistaken in his belief 
that individuals with borderline personality disorder are "controlling" and 
"abusive," Ciccone relies on the "National Institute of Mental Health's webpage 
discussing this disorder." (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7 (footnote omitted).) Ciccone 
did not proffer this webpage as evidence below, however. His attempt on appeal 
to prove the deficient performance prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim by presenting evidence that was never offered or considered below is 
improper, and the new evidence he cites must be disregarded. Nelson v. 
Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375, 379 (2007). 
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counsel was required to obtain and submit to the sentencing court a written 
psychological evaluation that was, at best, incomplete and, at worst, misleading. 
Unsurprisingly, Ciccone cites no authority for the proposition that it is objectively 
unreasonable for trial counsel to forego a written report rather than present a 
evidence indicating Dr. Beaver would have conspired to present a misleading or 
incomplete report. Even assuming trial counsel had the option of ethically 
employing the latter strategy and could have secured Dr. Beaver's cooperation, a 
decision to not do so would not have been objectively unreasonable; as 
explained by defense counsel at the evidentiary hearing (Tr., p.65, Ls.12-24.), 
the state, after reviewing the written report, could have sought its own expert to 
evaluate and report on Ciccone's mental condition, thereby exposing any flaws 
and/or omissions in the report prepared by Dr. Beaver. 
Ciccone argues otherwise, contending the second mistake of law trial 
counsel made was believing "that any presentation of a written report would 
result in the District Court authorizing a second evaluation from" the state's 
expert. (Appellant's brief, p.8.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, it is 
based on a faulty premise. Trial counsel did not testify that producing a written 
report "would result in" the authorization of a second evaluation. Rather, he 
testified only that the prosecutor "could have moved to have Mr. Ciccone 
evaluated by his own expert" (Tr., p.65, Ls.14-15), a proposition of law with which 
Ciccone agrees on appeal (see Appellant's brief, p.8). Second, and more 
importantly, Ciccone's assertion that "there is no statutory provision allowing a 
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second evaluation simply because the state wishes to dispute the original court 
appointed expert's conclusions" is false. Idaho Code § 18-207(4)(c) expressly 
provides that evidence of a defendant's mental condition is "subject to the 
adversarial process" and that: 
Raising an issue of mental condition in a criminal proceeding shall 
constitute a waiver of any privilege that might otherwise be 
interposed to bar the production of evidence on the subject and, 
upon request, the court shall order that the state's experts shall 
have access to the defendant in such cases for the purpose of 
having its own experts conduct an examination in preparation for 
any legal proceeding at which the defendant's mental condition 
may be in issue. 
I.C. § 18-207(4)(c). Because this statute requires a court, upon request, to 
authorize a second evaluation by the state's expert, it is clearly Ciccone, not trial 
counsel, who is laboring under a misapprehension of the law. 
Ciccone did not demonstrate below, and he has not demonstrated on 
appeal, any objective shortcoming in trial counsel's strategic decision to forego a 
written evaluation, in part, to avoid the risk of exposing Ciccone to an evaluation 
by an expert who, at the time, the defense bar referred to as "Dr. Death." Citing 
Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564, 149 P.3d 833, 839 (2006), Ciccone 
argues, that "[e]ven assuming trial counsel's worse [sic] fears regarding the 
appointment of 'Dr. Death' came true, Mr. Ciccone could not have been made to 
participate in that evaluation. He simply could have refused to speak to [the 
state's expert] and the doctor would not have been able to conduct a second 
evaluation." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) This argument is without merit. While 
Estrada makes clear that a defendant enjoys a Fifth Amendment right to not 
participate in certain presentence evaluations, nothing in the Estrada opinion 
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suggests that, once a defendant has waived that right by participating in a 
psychological evaluation conducted by an expert of the defendant's choosing, he 
may thereafter invoke it to avoid inquiry by the state on the subject matter of his 
mental condition. In fact, as discussed above, Idaho law provides exactly the 
-----:.t.- t"'--1/"-t'Af'"lr\r\-,IA\/_\"--··' ""''' r"""\c ,,IAl'"\111 ,-,.,... __ _,, 
u1-11-1u::s1L1::;. 01::;1::; 1.1...,. s 10-LUt\."+JlCJ, see a1so ;:,rare v. r'ayne, 140 1aano 040, or 1, 
199 P.3d 123, 146 (2008) (citing Buchanan v. Kentucky, 438 U.S. 402, 423 
(1987)) ("[A] defendant who raises mental status as a defense waives his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."). Having failed to demonstrate 
that trial counsel's decision to not obtain and submit a written psychological 
evaluation for use at sentencing was based on any legal or factual errors, or any 
other shortcoming capable of objective review, Ciccone has failed to show error 
in the trial court's determination that he failed to prove the deficient performance 
prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Ciccone has likewise failed to show error in the trial court's determination 
that he failed to prove prejudice. Ciccone argues that, had the sentencing court 
been aware of Dr. Beaver's opinion that there was a significant mental health 
component related to the offenses, there is a reasonable probability that it would 
have imposed less than the fixed life sentence Ciccone actually received. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) As found by the trial court, hm•vever, the sentencing 
court had before it a number of materials documenting Ciccone's mental 
condition, including letters from his family members and the records of his 
admission to lntermountain Hospital for a suicide attempt just weeks before he 
committed the murders of his wife and unborn child. (R., pp.171, 176-79.) 
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Although Dr. Beaver indicated that he would have opined in a written evaluation 
that there was "a significant mental-health component related to the events 
surrounding the death of Mr. Ciccone's wife and unborn child" (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
B, ,-r 9.c.), there was also evidence that such a report would have contained 
,4, I ..J ' • £ L • • I -1 • .t..l r\. • rr I r . r . 1 • • extreme,y uamagmg m,ormaLion, inc,uuiilg u1at 1..,1ccone sunereo nom ooraernne 
personality disorder and was "in deep denial of his culpability" for his crimes (Tr., 
p.63, L.6 - p.64, L.7; Respondent's Exhibit 13). In light of this evidence, and in 
view of all of the other information available to the sentencing court, Ciccone has 
failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that submitting a written 
report of Dr. Beaver's psychological evaluation "would not have changed the 
outcome of the sentence, and in fact," trial counsel's decision not to do so 
"presented a more favorable defense for the defendant" without exposing him to 
"the risk of a countervailing report by a psychologist for the State." (R., p.179.) 
The district court's finding that Ciccone failed to carry his burden of 
proving either deficient performance or prejudice is supported by substantial 
competent evidence and the applicable law. Ciccone has failed to show any 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment 
dismissing Ciccone's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 11th day of December, 2015. 
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